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LAWYERS ON TRIAL: JUROR HOSTILITY TO
DEFENDANTS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS*
Herbert M. Kritzer** & Neil Vidmar***

I.

INTRODUCTION

An enduring question in the study of civil justice is whether certain
types of parties are advantaged or disadvantaged as litigants. Professor
Marc Galanter’s classic essay, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,1 raises this question in
terms of resources and experience and has been the subject of extensive
testing.2 Other research has examined whether certain demographic
factors, such as race3 or gender,4 disadvantage plaintiffs, whether
* Prepared for presentation at conference entitled, “Lawyers as Targets: Suing, Prosecuting
and Defending Lawyers,” at Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, Institute for
the Study of Legal Ethics, April 1, 2015. This research has been supported by a Grant-in-Aid from
the University of Minnesota, the University of Minnesota Law School’s Steen Fund, and The
Russell M. Robinson II Faculty Chair account held by Neil Vidmar. We would like to thank
Christopher Robertson for making available a transcript of the mock medical malpractice trial used
in the experiment reported by Christopher Robertson and David Yokum. We would also like to
thank a lawyer whom we cannot name for making available his trial notebook for a trial observed by
the first author as part of another study, and Thomas Lindsay, at the University of Minnesota
College of Liberal Art’s Office of Information Technology for assistance in fielding the experiment
reported in this Article. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the 2014 Law and Society
Association Meeting in Minneapolis held from May 28 to June 1.
** Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Public Policy, University of Minnesota Law School;
B.A. Haverford College; Ph.D. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
*** Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Duke University;
B.A. MacMurray College; Ph.D. University of Illinois.
1. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
2. See generally Brian J. Glenn, The Varied and Abundant Progeny, in IN LITIGATION: DO
THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 371 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003)
(discussing Marc Galanter’s contributions to academic discourse).
3. AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, INST. CIVIL JUSTICE, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 37-41 (1985).
4. See NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., INST. CIVIL JUSTICE, CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS 32 (2004). See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden
Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004).
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government litigants are particularly advantaged,5 and whether deeppocket corporate defendants are disfavored by juries.6 In this Article, we
examine a group one might expect to come to court as advantaged
players—lawyers.
Society has long had a love-hate relationship with the legal
profession.7 Public opinion polls typically show that lawyers are held in
low esteem, usually being described as untrustworthy, manipulative, and
overly concerned about their own financial advantage.8 As Galanter has
reported, these views of lawyers are reflected in the large corpus of jokes
told about lawyers.9
Indeed, public disdain for lawyers is neither a new phenomenon,
nor a phenomenon restricted to the United States or other common law
countries. William Shakespeare’s plays include eleven references to
lawyers, nine of which are negative or mocking. 10 John Stuart Mill is
quoted criticizing a lawyer as being ready “to frustrate justice with his
tongue.”11 On the continent, Prussian King Wilhelm issued an edict in
1739 proclaiming:
[T]hose advocates, procurators and draftsmen . . . who dare make
people rebellious by having soldiers hand over to His Royal Majesty
petitions on the most negligible matters or any other documents on

5. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come Out Ahead in
Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 342, 343-50
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The
Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. L. REV. 391, 397-407
(2000).
6. VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 42 (2000).
7. Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care? 29 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1405, 1407-17 (1999).
8. Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes,
and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 808-10 (1998); Gross, supra note 7, at 1416.
9. MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES & LEGAL CULTURE 16 (2005).
10. These figures are derived from MARVIN SPEVACK, THE HARVARD CONCORDANCE TO
SHAKESPEARE (1973). While the best known of these quotes—“first thing we do, let’s kill all the
lawyers”—is spoken by a character who is himself less than upright, other lines reflect the
perceived greed of lawyers: “then ‘tis like the breath of an unfee’d lawyer” or “[o]’er lawyers’
fingers, who straight dream on fees.” See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 4;
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, sc. 4; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND
PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2. It is important to note, however, that a goodly portion
of the audience at the Globe Theatre was lawyers who came from the Inns of Court which are more
or less directly across the Thames from where the Globe stood.
11. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 12 (1973). Public opinion polls in
England show a decline in “approval ratings for lawyers” in recent years. ALAN PATERSON,
LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: DEMOCRACY IN ACTION? 18 (2012).
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justice, such as those asking for pardon, shall be hanged with a dog
hanged at their side, granting neither mercy nor pardon.12

A 1978 poll conducted by a French television broadcaster queried 982
viewers as to their images of the avocat; fewer than 5% held a positive
view.13 Of those holding a negative view: 18% conveyed general
negative attitudes; 48% felt that the avocat was a “money sucker”; 14%
saw him as a man without conscience; 14% felt that he acted with
impunity; 4% considered him to be an auxiliary of scoundrels; and, 3%
suspected him of connivance with his client’s opponent.14
While most evidence of hostility toward lawyers takes expressive
forms, such as jokes, popular culture, and attitudes, there is less evidence
that the hostility has behavioral manifestations. There are generally held
viewpoints specific to certain types of lawyers, particularly plaintiffs’
lawyers who bring personal injury suits or shareholder suits. These
lawyers have been the targets of political campaigns and legislation.
Another example that has been reported is the unwillingness of some
landlords to rent apartments to lawyers.15
In the United States, the public has another way to demonstrate its
negativity toward the legal profession: assessing liability and damages in
legal malpractice trials. In this Article, we report the results of an
experiment designed to assess whether jury decisions in such cases
reflect the public negativity one finds in public opinion polls, jokes, and
other expressions of popular culture.

12. Erhard Blankenburg & Ulrike Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated
Profession, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 126 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C.
Lewis eds., 1988).
13. Tang Thi Thanh Trai Le, The French Legal Profession: A Prisoner of Its Glorious Past?,
15 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 63 (1982). L’avocats comprise one of many branches of the French legal
profession. See Anne Boigeol, The French Bar: The Difficulties of Unifying a Divided Profession,
in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds.,
1988). It is important to note that the figures referenced above refer to the public’s general
perception of lawyers, not the evaluation of a lawyer by a former or current client. A 2001 study
found generally positive views of lawyers representing individuals involved in court proceedings.
See Enquête de Satisfaction Auprès des Usagers de la Justice: Mai 2001, RECHERCHE DROIT ET
JUSTICE, http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/014000589.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2016).
14. Le, supra note 13, at 63.
15. Tom Goldstein, Landlords Backed on the Right to Bar the Well-Informed, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1977, at A1 (reporting that a landlord could refuse to rent to lawyers because the housing
anti-discimination law did not bar discrimination based on occupation). The New York City Council
subsequently passed a measure barring discrimination based on occupation. See Alan Finder,
Committee Votes a Ban on Job Bias in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1986, at B1; see also David
Berreby, Rent Wars: Lawyers vs. Landlords, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 1983, at 8; Gregg Geller, No
Dogs, or Lawyers, Need Apply, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at CY 15.
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II. THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE STUDY
The experiment reported below is part of an ongoing, larger study
of legal malpractice claims.16 That larger project has involved: a series
of conversations with legal malpractice insurers and lawyers who
represent either plaintiffs or defendants in legal malpractice lawsuits;17
analyses of insurance reports of legal malpractice claims from Florida
and Missouri (where state law requires reporting to the insurance
commission);18 analyses of legal malpractice cases found in the Bureau
of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) studies of civil verdicts for 1996, 2001, and
2005;19 and, civil jury reports from Cook County, Illinois. It also builds
on the first author’s experience as an observer in lawyers’ offices as part
of his study of contingency fee legal practice.20
Despite claims about the frequency of legal malpractice,21 one of
the striking findings of our larger research project is the scarcity of trials
involving legal malpractice claims. The data collected for the three BJS
studies have a total of only 156 verdicts in legal malpractice cases
compared to 1908 in medical malpractice cases, yielding a ratio of
medical malpractice verdicts to legal malpractice verdicts of over 12 to
1. The civil jury reports we obtained for Cook County for the period of
January 1988 through December 2014 included 105 jury verdicts in legal
malpractice cases.22 During that same period, the jury reporter recorded
3802 verdicts in medical malpractice trials for a ratio of 36 to 1.23
This is surprising given evidence that there are large numbers of
potential legal malpractice claims. The best data on this matter come
16. See infra Part III.
17. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, Handling Legal Malpractice Claims:
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, Defense Lawyers, and Insurers (working paper 2015) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review) (discussing legal malpractice claims). This paper was prepared for a presentation in
Oñati, Spain at the workshop on Consumer Redress When Lawyers Are Negligent, Int’l Inst. for the
Soc. of Law (July 9-10, 2015).
18. Id. at 8 n.44, 18 n.60.
19. Herbert M. Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, When the Lawyer Screws Up: A Portrait of Legal
Malpractice Claims and Their Resolution 13 (working paper 2015) (on file with the Hofstra Law
Review).
20. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 26, 96-98 (2004).
21. See Manuel Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1657, 1664-69 (1994).
22. The date range refers to when the report was published by the Illinois Jury Verdict
Reporter rather than the date of the actual verdict. See Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 17, at 14 &
n.72.
23. Email from John Kirkton, Jury Verdict Reporter, Law Bulletin Publ’g Co., to Herbert
Kritzer, Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Pub. Policy, Univ. Minn. Law Sch. (Feb. 4, 2015,
8:14 AM) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). The figure for medical malpractice trials was
provided by the publisher of the verdict editor.
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from Oregon, which is the only state where legal malpractice insurance
is mandatory for private practitioners.24 The annual claim rate based on
figures from the Oregon Professional Liability Fund—the provider of
the mandatory insurance—is about 12 claims per 100 insured lawyers.25
Compare this ratio to the frequency of medical malpractice claims,
which, according to a study using closed claim data from Texas before
major limits on damages were implemented, ranged from 20 to 30 per
100 physicians.26 A second study, using closed claim data from Florida,
shows numbers suggesting claims per 100 physicians may be around
10.27 This means that the ratio of medical malpractice claims to legal
malpractice claims could be as low as 1 to 1 or as high as 2 or 3 to 1,
while the ratio of medical malpractice to legal malpractice cases that
reach trial is many times that.
There are a variety of reasons why legal malpractice claims might
be infrequent among cases that get to trial. First, the typical legal
malpractice claim involves lower levels of damages than is the case in
medical malpractice claims. While some legal malpractice claims
involving corporate plaintiffs might entail seven, eight, or nine figure
financial losses, many legal malpractice claims will not involve
sufficient damages to make the cases attractive to lawyers working on a
contingency fee basis because the percentage of the potential recovery is
too low to generate a fee sufficient for the lawyer to want to take the
case.28 Second, outside of Oregon, significant numbers of private
24. Jeffrey D. Watters, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Why Clients Should Know if
Their Attorney Does Not Carry Malpractice Insurance, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 245, 258 (2010).
25. This figure was computed using the number of claims for 2011, 2012, and 2013 as
reported in recent annual reports of the Professional Liability Fund (“PLF”), and the number of
lawyers insured by the fund as provided by Carol Bernick, Chief Executive Officer of PLF. See IRA
R. ZAROV, PLF ANNUAL REPORTS, OR. ST. B. PROF. LIABILITY FUND, https://www.osbplf.org/
about-plf/annual-reports.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016); email from Carol Bernick, Chief Exec.
Officer, PLF, to Herbert Kritzer, Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Pub. Policy, Univ. Minn.
Law Sch. (Feb. 18, 2015, 2:58 PM) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). These figures reflect
actual claims rather than simply notification from an insured of a potential claim. Email from Carol
Bernick, Chief Exec. Officer, PLF, to Herbert Kritzer, Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Pub.
Policy, Univ. Minn. Law Sch. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:59 PM) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (“A
file is opened when a claim is made. A claim is defined as a demand for money . . . directly from the
claimant, from a lawyer for the claimant [or from our insured after receiving] a demand for money
[from the claimant or the claimant’s lawyer].”).
26. Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas,
1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 236 fig. 7 (2005).
27. Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 332 tbl. 3 (2005). However, in making these
comparisons it needs to be noted that in many medical malpractice cases the injuries may be far
more serious than in legal malpractice cases.
28. This is also true of many medical malpractice claims. See Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note
17, at 88.
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practitioners, particularly those in small firms or solo practice where
malpractice claims are most likely,29 are uninsured. For example, a
survey conducted by the Texas State Bar in 2005 found that 63% of solo
practitioners in Texas reported that they were uninsured.30 Third, the law
and the judges and arbitrators who administer that law appear somewhat
hostile toward claims of legal malpractice, consequently erecting
barriers that do not exist with regard to negligence by members of other
professions.31 Fourth, lawyers may be more willing to settle claims than
are physicians, either because they fear the reputational hit of losing a
legal malpractice case at trial or because they do not face the prospect of
public reporting of payments made to resolve the claims, as do
physicians who must report such payments to the publicly accessible
National Practitioner Data Bank.32 Fifth, and most important for the
analysis we present below, there is a perception among experienced
litigators that juries are biased against lawyer defendants, and hence,
legal malpractice cases may be settled before trial more often than other
kinds of professional malpractice cases.33 Legal malpractice is usually a
29. William H. Gates, Lawyers’ Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a Growing Problem,
37 MERCER L. REV. 559, 559 (1986). It is easy to overstate the likelihood of malpractice among
solo and small firm practitioners, but it is important to keep in mind that about three quarters of
private practitioners work in such settings. See CLARA N. CARSON & JEEYOON PARK, AM. BAR
FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2005, at 10 (2012).
However, there is good evidence that the claim rate (claims per 100 or 1000 practitioners) is higher
among small firms and solo practitioners than among large firm practitioners. See Tom Baker &
Rick Swedloff, Liability Insurer Data as a Window on Lawyers’ Professional Liability, U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 22) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Kritzer &
Vidmar, supra note 17, at 2.
30. Chuck Herring & Bill Miller, Pro/Con Professional Liability Disclosure, 72 TEX. B.J.
822, 823 n.2 (2009).
31. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
161-87 (2011); Louis A. Russo, The Consequences of Arbitrating a Legal Malpractice Claim:
Rebuilding Faith in the Legal Profession, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 327, 340 (2006).
32. See Russo, supra note 31, at 336; Lawrence E. Smarr, A Comparative Assessment of the
PIAA Data Sharing Project and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy, Purpose and
Application, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS, 59, 68 (1997).
33. See Ramos, supra note 21, at 1681 (1994) (noting an increase in juror hostility toward
lawyers). However, other sources argue that lawyers can receive a fair hearing by jurors and that
they usually win malpractice cases that get to trial. See Lisa Chalidze, Defending the Legal
Malpractice Claim Arising from Representation of Small Business, 62 AM. JUR. TRIALS 395 § 1
(1997); Mark O’Neill, Do Juries Treat Lawyers Fairly in Legal Malpractice Cases, 58 DEF. COUNS.
J. 248, 248-49 (1991). At least one commentary argues that defendant-lawyers are advantaged in
legal malpractice cases due to bias by judges. Judicial Bias in Legal Malpractice Cases, VOLKEMA
THOMAS MILLER & SCOTT, http://www.vt-law.com/blog/2012/01/judicial-bias-in-legal-malpracticecases.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). We note, however, Mark O’Neill cites high win rates for
lawyers in legal malpractice cases—anywhere from 2 to 1 to as high as 4 to 1—which is not
consistent with what we observed in either data collected by the BJS, which we reanalyzed, or data
that we compiled using the Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter; the win rate for defendants in both of
these data sources was around 50%: 51% in the BJS data and 44% in the Illinois data.
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negligence-based tort claim.34 As such, the plaintiff must prove the four
standard elements of negligence: (1) that the defendant had a duty to the
plaintiff; (2) that the defendant had breached that duty; (3) that the
breach had caused injury; and, (4) that the injury had resulted in damage
to the plaintiff.35 The archetypical legal malpractice case arises when the
lawyer has missed a filing deadline in a “slam-dunk” personal injury suit
(for example, a passenger in a car involved in an accident, or a
pedestrian in a crosswalk), which results in the plaintiff’s claim against
the original tortfeasor being barred. A plaintiff in this situation will
likely now have a claim against the lawyer who missed the filing
deadline. Clearly, the lawyer had a duty to the plaintiff and presumably
breached that duty. The question that will arise is whether that breach of
duty caused any damage to the plaintiff; that is, would the plaintiff’s
original claim have succeeded had the case gone to trial? Thus, when
this kind of legal malpractice claim is tried, the question at trial is
actually the underlying personal injury claim, or what is commonly
referred to as the “case-within-the-case.”
The issue is best illustrated from an incident that occurred during
the first author’s observations in three law firms as part of his study of
contingency fee practice.36 A lawyer in one of the firms had missed a
filing deadline, and the firm was appealing the dismissal by arguing that
the deadline was actually a couple of days later. One of the lawyers
explained that if the appeal was unsuccessful, the firm was likely to be
sued by its client. The lawyer went on to observe that while the client
would still have to prove the underlying case (the “case-within-thecase”), juries were more likely to find negligence in the underlying case
when it was the plaintiff’s former lawyer who would be on the hook for
the damages than when it was the original defendant who would have to
pay any award. In this instance, the firm was successful on its appeal, so
the issue of what would happen at a legal malpractice trial was not
tested. Nor would it likely have been tested, given the lawyer’s concern
about jurors’ attitudes toward lawyer defendants; almost certainly the
firm’s insurer would have settled with the client.
In the course of our conversations with insurers and practitioners in
the legal malpractice arena, a number of people mentioned this same
34. Claims can also be brought against lawyers by former clients (or possibly the beneficiary
of former clients) under a contract theory, a breach of fiduciary duty theory, or possibly a fraud
theory; lawyers can also, in some circumstances, face fraud claims from nonclients. See VINCENT R.
JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW 13-14, 166-88 (2011).
35. See Chalidze, supra note 33, at 395 § 5.
36. The study is reported in HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS:
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004). However, the incident
described here is not recounted in that book.
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phenomenon. Juries, they believe, are sufficiently hostile to lawyers so
that the jurors are more likely to find negligence in the underlying case
in the context of a legal malpractice trial than if the original case went to
trial. We were unable to find any systematic evidence in support of this
proposition, but it appears to loom large in the minds of insurers and
practitioners. The perception of juror hostility might explain the fact that
a large percentage of legal malpractice trials are bench trials. Our
analysis of data on trial outcomes in 1996, 2001, and 2005, collected by
the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) on behalf of the BJS,
showed that 38.5% of legal malpractice trials were bench trials
compared to only 2% in trials of physician malpractice.37
Ideally, one would try to test this hypothesis by looking at actual
jury verdicts. However, that approach is not practical. In the small
number of legal malpractice cases in the BJS/NCSC dataset, there is a
very modest tendency for juries to find for the plaintiff more often than
do judges in bench trials (53% versus 43%), a difference that is not
statistically significant given the small number of cases, and, also, a
figure that is confounded by case selection issues.38 However, the small
number of cases and case selection are actually not the most severe
problem. First, it is likely that the cases tried to the bench are different in
important ways from those tried to juries.39 Second, and more important,
given that, as noted above, in a legal malpractice case the plaintiff
generally has to prove both the case-within-the-case and the lawyer’s
negligence, there is no way to know from actual cases whether the
difference is due to one or both elements. Even if one could match the
case-within-the-case in legal malpractice cases to simple negligence
cases, this problem of confounding would still exist.
37. These figures exclude cases where a trial started, but the parties reached a settlement
before a verdict was reached. These data are available from the Interuniversity Consortium for
Political and Social Research (“ICPSR”)—ICPSR studies 2883, 3957, and 23862. For the 1996 and
2001 studies, the data were drawn for a sample of 45 and 46 of the 75 largest counties in the United
States. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 173426,
CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (Sept. 1999),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf; THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 202803, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001,
(Apr. 2004), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctcvlc01.pdf; LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H.
COHEN U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 223851, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS,
2005 (Oct. 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf. The 2005 study was expanded
to include a stratified sample of 110 of the 3066 counties outside the 75 largest. For details
regarding the sampling strategy for the 2005 study, see LANGTON & COHEN, supra at 11.
38. These figures are from our own reanalysis of the 2005 BJS civil verdict study. The data
for this study was obtained from the ICPSR data archive. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ICPSR 23862, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2005 at 9-13 (2005).
39. A bench trial will occur only if neither party has requested a jury trial. If either party
thinks it would be advantaged by having a jury, then that party will demand a jury trial.
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Thus, arguably, testing the hypothesis that lawyer-defendants are
disadvantaged in jury trials is best accomplished experimentally. One
can ask simulating jurors to decide the identical underlying case in the
context of that case alone versus in the context of a legal malpractice
case where the lawyer’s negligence has been stipulated. With this kind
of experiment, the only difference in the cases will be whether the
defendant is the former lawyer or the original defendant. This was an
approach used by Valerie Hans in her study of whether jurors were more
or less likely to hold a business responsible than a homeowner.40 Using
simulated jurors, the experiment reported below tested two hypotheses
regarding lawyers being disadvantaged as defendants: (1) juries are more
likely to find for the plaintiff when the defendant who will have to pay
any damages is the plaintiff’s former lawyer; and (2) juries award more
in damages when the defendant is the plaintiff’s former lawyer.41
III.

METHOD

To test the two hypotheses, we designed an Internet experiment
involving three distinct cases: the first involving an auto accident where
the issue related to causation of one of the claimed injuries and damages;
the second involving a slip (actually a trip) and fall on a sidewalk in a
residential neighborhood involving both liability and damages; and, the
third involving a claim of medical malpractice concerning both liability
and damages. We describe each of our cases in more detail below.42 For
each of the three cases, we created two versions: a legal malpractice
version in which the plaintiff’s original lawyer had missed a filing
deadline and was consequently being sued for legal malpractice; and, a
control version being the original tort case itself. In the legal malpractice
condition, the respondents were told that the lawyer was not contesting
the allegation that he had missed the filing deadlines (that is, he had
breached his duty to his former client);43 they were only to decide
whether the original tortfeasor was negligent and what damages were
due to the plaintiff. In the legal malpractice condition, we included a
question to determine if the respondent had recognized that the lawyer
was the defendant and excluded from the analysis persons who had not
understood that it was the lawyer who was the defendant who would
have to pay any damages.44 The experiment produced a total of 1157
40. Hans, supra note 6, at 42-46.
41. See infra Part III.
42. See infra Part III.A–C.
43. The defendant-lawyer was male in all three of our cases.
44. We conducted three rounds of the experiment. We used the results of the first round to
estimate the percentage of respondents in the legal malpractice condition for each of the three cases
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usable respondents who comprise the sample used in the analysis
reported below.45 The median time required by those respondents to
complete the exercise was 20.4 minutes.46
A. The Cases
1. Auto Case
The auto case was based on a trial observed by the first author in a
rural county in a Midwestern state. The defense lawyer for that case
made his trial notebook available. It included the deposition transcripts
for the treating physicians and the defense’s medical expert. The
accident occurred because an elderly driver made a left turn in front of
oncoming traffic. The plaintiff, a young mother, collided with the
defendant’s car. The issue in the case was whether the plaintiff suffered
an injury. She declined transportation to the hospital at the scene of the
accident, but later went to an urgent care facility. The plaintiff testified
that at urgent care she complained of pain in both her chest and her knee;
she also had bruising on her face, presumably from the airbag that
deployed. However, the clinic notes said nothing about complaints
involving knee pain. A week after the accident, the plaintiff attended a
previously-made appointment with a nurse-practitioner because she
thought she might be pregnant. She testified that she told the nursepractitioner about the accident and that she still had some pain in her
neck, back, and knee. Again, the notes of the appointment made no
mention of knee pain (although, in later testimony, it came out that the
notes did report that the nurse-practitioner observed a “well-healed
bruise area” on the knee).
The first medical record showing any evidence of pain in the knee
was from an appointment two or three weeks after the accident when the
plaintiff went to her clinic complaining about the knee. At that time, she
was told to wear a knee brace and make an appointment with an
orthopedist. She saw the orthopedist about a month after the accident;
the orthopedist did not take an x-ray, but told her to continue wearing the
who recognized the manipulation and then oversampled in the subsequent rounds to try to
equalize the number of usable responses for the experimental and control conditions for each of the
three cases.
45. See supra Part III.A.
46. The results reported below are based on all respondents who completed the experiment
and passed the manipulation check for the experimental (legal malpractice) condition. We repeated
the analysis limiting the respondents to those who took between 5 and 120 minutes to complete the
experiment; presumably, some of those who took a long time to complete were multitasking and
took time to engage in other tasks. This eliminated a total of 71 respondents, but had little effect on
the results reported below although some tests that achieved statistical significance with all
respondents did not make the cut-off with the reduced number of respondents.
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knee brace and undergo physical therapy. The pain actually became
worse over the next several months, and when she finally returned to the
orthopedist’s office, she saw a different physician who suggested she
have an MRI. Because she was pregnant, she postponed the MRI until
after her daughter was born. After the MRI, the orthopedist suggested
some injections, but she decided not to receive them because the
orthopedist told her that he could not be sure that they would help. She
did not return until almost eighteen months later, after she had consulted
with a lawyer who told her to go back to the orthopedist. At that time,
the orthopedist told her that she needed a surgical procedure to look
inside the knee and repair any damage. That procedure was carried out,
and the knee was healed by the time of the trial.
In his trial testimony, the treating orthopedist reported that the
radiologist who read the MRI initially read the result as showing both
fluid and a tear in the meniscus (the tendon inside the knee that holds the
knee in proper position and supports it), but then modified his diagnosis
to fluid and degeneration of the meniscus, but no tear through the
meniscus. When the orthopedist personally reviewed the film after the
plaintiff returned following advice from her lawyer, he thought he saw a
tear in the meniscus and recommended a surgical procedure to further
diagnose and possibly repair the condition. The orthopedist also testified
that he had seen nothing in the medical records indicating any kind of
injury to the knee that would have existed prior to the accident.
The orthopedist hired by the defense reported that he had examined
the plaintiff prior to the surgery and had reviewed the film of the MRI.
He agreed with the revised diagnosis of the radiologist concluding that
there was some change to the meniscus, but no tear. He also testified that
striking the knee on the steering column, which is what the plaintiff
claimed had happened in the accident, was not the kind of mechanism
normally associated with a tear to the meniscus; such an injury typically
occurs when the leg is twisted, as might happen during activities such as
running, walking, jumping, or going up or down stairs. In his closing
argument, the defense lawyer suggested that the tear could have
occurred by the plaintiff unknowingly twisting her knee, as she was
dealing with the care of her young children.
The questions the jury was asked to decide were essentially whether
the knee injury was due to the accident and, if it was, what damages
(past pain and suffering, medical expenses, future pain and suffering)
would be appropriate compensation in connection with that injury. In
addition, the jury needed to determine the appropriate pain and suffering
damages for the injuries that were not contested. The plaintiff’s lawyer
suggested total damages of about $57,000, which included the roughly
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$550 for lost wages and the charges from the urgent care clinic. While
opposing any damages for the knee surgery, the defense acceded to
damages covering the initial diagnostic procedures (including the
MRI) and other treatment and suggested total damages of between
$6000 and $7500. The simulated jurors were then asked to award
amounts for medical expenses, past pain and suffering, and future pain
and suffering.47
2. Medical Malpractice Case
The medical malpractice case was based on the hypothetical case
used by Christopher Robertson and David Yokum.48 Those researchers
used a thirty-five minute videotaped mock trial in their experiment.
Robertson shared with the present authors a transcript produced from the
videotape, which was the basis of the case script for the medical
malpractice case. Robertson and Yokum described the case in the
following way:
The script was written by practicing physicians, who also served as
both project consultants and the actors playing the expert witnesses.
The scenario concerned the failure of a primary care physician to
diagnose a possible case of lumbar radiculopathy [nerve irritation
caused by damage to the discs between the vertebrae] and refer the
patient to imaging, which allegedly would have allowed timely surgery
and avoidance of the permanent disability that the patient now suffers.
The primary dispute concerned whether the physician-defendant met
the standard of care when, instead of ordering imaging, he simply
instructed the patient to take painkillers and return if the pain got
worse. The case was designed so that there was a right answer to this
question of medical doctrine, one given by a national practice
guideline published in the Annals of Internal Medicine.49 According to
that guideline and the stipulated facts, the physician did violate the

47. As noted above, this case was based on an actual trial observed by the first author. The
jury in that trial awarded a total of about $17,500 in damages. That award included $7500 for past
pain and suffering, about $9800 for past medical expenses, the stipulated amount for past wages,
and $0 for future pain and suffering. Essentially, this was a win for the defense; the only part of the
award that went beyond what was suggested by the defense was the cost of the knee surgery itself.
The last demand from the plaintiff was $38,000; the defendant had made a formal offer of judgment
in the amount of $14,800 and a further settlement offer prior to trial of $16,000.
48. Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, The Effect of Blinded Experts on Juror
Verdicts, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 765, 770 (2012). In Robertson and Yokum’s experiment, the
manipulation was whether one or both experts were “blinded” as to which side they were hired by
with “neither” blinded as the control. Id.
49. Roger Chou et al., Diagnosis and Treatment of Low Back Pain: A Joint Clinical Practice
Guideline from the American College of Physicians and the American Pain Society, 147 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 478, 478 (2007).
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standard of care.50 To avoid confounding with the variables of interest,
this guideline was not introduced in the stimulus trial for the present
experiment. It is only a reference point for analysis.
The trial consisted of the following sequence: the trial judge’s
introduction and preliminary instructions (based on the Revised
Arizona Jury Instructions (RAJI)), very brief opening statements
from the plaintiff and the defendant’s attorneys, the testimony of
plaintiff’s expert, the cross-examination of plaintiff’s expert, the
testimony of defendant’s expert, the cross-examination of defendant’s
expert, very brief closing statements from the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s attorneys, and, lastly, jury instructions from the trial judge
(also based on the RAJI).51

Our reworking of the transcript produced a narrative of a trial with
opening and closing statements, testimony by the experts for the two
sides, and instructions from the judge.52
3. Premises Case
The premises case was based on a case narrative used by researcher
Leslie Ellis53 and was modified slightly for the present experiment. In
this case, the plaintiff tripped over a sidewalk crack. His injuries
included a cut to his forehead, a fractured eye socket, and headaches and
dizziness for a period of years that limited his ability to work. The
defendant was the owner of the home adjacent to the sidewalk. By law,
homeowners are responsible for maintaining the sidewalk in front of
their houses, and are liable for injuries if the sidewalk deteriorates to the
point that it is in an “unreasonably dangerous condition.”54 A central

50. See Robertson & Yokum, supra note 48, at 771. For the control condition, only 46% of
the respondents found the physician negligent, even though they had designed the case so that the
physician was in fact negligent. It is important to note again that the practice guide was not
introduced; the standard of care was introduced only through expert testimony.
51. Id.
52. Our version used only Robertson and Yokum’s control condition in which both experts
knew which side had retained them. We actually included a third condition, which we do not report
in this Article. In that condition, we changed the physician’s name to something very foreignsounding to see if the physician from a group commonly seen as comprised of relatively recent
immigrants was disadvantaged by his apparent national heritage. Without going into detail, we
found no differences between that condition and our control condition, which used a name that
would be seen as traditionally American.
53. Leslie Ellis, Don’t Find My Client Liable, But If You Do . . . : Defense
Recommendations, Liability Verdicts, and General Damage Awards 193-206 (2002) (unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago). Ellis’s research question dealt with the impact
of the lawyers suggesting specific amounts of damages.
54. Mark C. Dillon, Breaking the Ice: How Plaintiffs May Establish Premise Liability in
“Black Ice” Cases Where the Dangerous Condition Is by Definition Not Visible or Apparent to
Property Owners, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 694-97, 695 n.26 (2015).
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question in this last case was whether the crack was sufficiently large to
have made the sidewalk unreasonably dangerous. If the juror found it to
be unreasonably dangerous, she needed to set an amount to compensate
the plaintiff for past and future non-economic damages, including pain
and suffering. The amount that the plaintiff would receive for medical
expenses and lost wages if the defendant was found liable had been
agreed to by the parties. In the version used in our research, there were
opening and closing statements by the lawyers for each side, instructions
from the judge, and testimony from three witnesses: the plaintiff, the
homeowner, and a neighbor who witnessed the plaintiff falling. The
simulated jurors were also shown a photo of the sidewalk with the crack.
The plaintiff testified to the specific event and the impact of his injuries.
The defendant testified that the crack had been there for some time and
that, to his knowledge, no one had ever tripped on it prior to the plaintiff.
The neighbor testified that she worked at home by a window that looks
out toward the defendant’s house. She reported that she saw a lot of
people walking down the sidewalk and had never witnessed anyone
falling; she said that most people would see the crack and step over it.
In closing arguments, the plaintiff’s attorney asked for $100,000 in
damages. The defense attorney argued that the sidewalk was not
unreasonably dangerous, and hence, the homeowner should not be found
to have been negligent. He went on to argue that if the jurors were to
find the homeowner to be negligent, the non-economic damages should
be no more than $10,000.
B. Sample and Survey Administration
The sample population was drawn from an internet panel obtained
through Qualtrics.55 Potential respondents were screened for jury
eligibility by asking if they were registered to vote. Those who were not
registered were asked if they were a U.S. citizen and, if yes, whether
they would be eligible to vote if there were an upcoming election.
Potential respondents who were not citizens or who could not register to
vote were excluded. Respondents who completed the questions at the
end of the case narrative were compensated in accordance with the
policies of the panel provider.56
55. Qualtrics is a survey service which provides both an online platform for surveys and
sample generation. See QUALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
56. We paid $5 per respondent; we do not know how much of that actually went to the
respondents. Generally, online survey panelists are slightly younger and better educated than the
population as a whole, which means that our sample probably does not perfectly mirror a jury pool;
of course, our respondents were not subject to anything resembling voir dire, which further
distinguishes them from actual jurors.
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After completing the informed consent section, respondents were
screened for eligibility. Those determined to be eligible then read a brief
introductory section followed by the case narrative itself. After
completing the case narrative, respondents assigned to the experimental
condition (legal malpractice) were asked a question to determine if they
understood who the defendant was. As noted above, respondents who
failed to identify the lawyer as the defendant were excluded from the
analysis we report below. The next questions were the actual jury
questions concerning liability and/or damages, as would be found on a
jury verdict form. Respondents then completed a small set of
demographic questions (year of birth, gender, education, current
occupation, and household income), a political orientation/ideology
question, questions about experience serving on juries or personal
involvement as a plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit, two questions
assessing attitudes toward the tort system, and, depending on the
condition questions, about whether the respondent or anyone in the
respondent’s immediate family had attended (or was attending) law or
medical school.
The survey was administered by the staff of the University of
Minnesota College of Liberal Arts’ Office of Information Technology
using the Qualtrics survey system.
C. Results
1. Auto Case
Because there was no issue of liability in the auto case, the
respondents were only asked to provide amounts for three elements of
damages: medical expenses, past pain and suffering, and future pain and
suffering. Our hypothesis was that higher damages would be awarded in
the legal malpractice condition. Table 1 shows various statistics for each
of the three elements of damages and for the total of those three
elements, along with the results of four statistical tests.57

57. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1: DAMAGES FOR AUTO ACCIDENT CASE

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
t-test
median test (below)
median test (above)
Wilcoxon rank sum test

(a)
Past Medical
Control
Experimental
$3,649
$5,425
$375
$720
$6,214
$16,290
t=1.41, p=.079
Z=1.56, p=.060
Z=1.90, p=.028
Z=1.37, p=.085

(b)
Past Pain & Suffering
Control
Experimental
$4,040
$8,439
$750
$1,000
$7,810
$41,098
t=1.47, p=.072
Z=1.62, p=.053
Z=1.71, p=.044
Z=1.54, p=.062

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
t-test
median test (below)
median test (above)
Wilcoxon rank sum test

(c)
Future Pain & Suffering
Control
Experimental
$3,059
$13,463
$11
$100
$7,181
$101,198
t=1.43, p=.077
Z=0.78, p=.218
Z=0.65, p=.251
Z=0.78, p=.219

(d)
Total Damages
Control
Experimental
$10,747
$27,327
$2,175
$3,100
$17,720
$146,719
t=1.57, p=.060
Z=1.51, p=.066
Z=1.91, p=..028
Z=1.41, p=.079

Notes: N's are 178 for control and 195 for experimental; t-tests assume unequal
variances; all p-values are one-tailed

Looking only at the means shown in Table 1, it appears that there
were substantial differences between the experimental and control
groups, with the mean for the former about three times the latter for total
damages and more than four times the latter for future pain and
suffering. However, none of the t-tests shown in Table 1 achieved
statistical significance at the .05 one-tailed level, although all would be
significant at the .10 one-tailed level. The patterns shown in Table 1
could well have been produced by a random process rather than reflect
systematic differences between conditions.58 A close examination of the
distributions of the various damage amounts set by the two groups of
respondents shows that the apparent differences evidenced by the means
probably reflect a small number of outliers among the respondents in the
experimental condition. Moreover, the medians shown in Table 1 do
exhibit particularly large differences in absolute terms. Perhaps there are
differences, but these are obscured by the outliers. To check for this
possibility, we also ran tests that are not sensitive to a small number of
extreme values.
58. All of the t-tests were done assuming unequal variances for the two groups because the
test for equality of variances showed very clearly that the variances for the two groups were not
equal, and that is fairly clear in the standard deviations shown in Table 1.
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We applied two such tests. As shown in Table 1, the median test59
provides inconsistent evidence of statistically discernible differences in
the amounts awarded for past medical costs, past pain and suffering, and
total damages. The inconsistency arises from how observations falling
exactly at the median are handled. The test is significant at the .05 level
only when we combine those observations with the observations falling
above the median test. For future pain and suffering, the median test
provides no evidence of significant differences between the control and
experimental group.
A second test that is insensitive to extreme values is the Wilcoxon
rank sum test.60 As shown in Table 1, none of the Wilcoxon rank sum
tests achieved statistical significance at the .05 level, although three (the
two past damage amounts and total damages) would be statistically
significant at the .10 level (one-tailed).
Another approach to dealing with the skew in the amounts of
damages is to convert the values to natural logarithms. This also has the
advantage of shifting the distribution to something that more closely
approaches the normal distribution, which is one of the standard
assumptions of the t-test. Table 2 shows a series of t-tests based on the
natural logarithms of the damage amounts.61 The column labeled emean is
the exponentiation of the mean of the logarithm of the damages.62 The
results shown in Table 2 are consistent with the previous discussion; the
only statistically significant differences (or almost statistically
significant differences) are for past pain and suffering and total damages.
59. SIDNEY SIEGEL, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 115-16
(1956). In the median test, the observations are split into those above and below the overall median,
and then separate proportions for above and below the overall median for the two groups to be
compared. The statistical test is either a simple difference of proportions test or a 2x2 chi square
test; we used the former because we have a directional hypothesis. The software we used, Stata,
actually computes the chi square; we report the square root of that chi square and divide the p-value
of the chi square by two in order to obtain the one-tailed p-value. One challenge in performing the
median test is the handling of observations that fall exactly at the overall median; there are four
alternatives: classify all of these cases into the below group, classify all cases into the above group,
exclude cases falling at the median, and splitting the cases at the median into above and below.
Tables 1, 3, and 4 show only results using the first two approaches.
60. See THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS
525 (1990). The Wilcoxon test, which is equivalent to the Mann-Whitney U test, can be thought of
as roughly equivalent to a t-test which has been done on the ranks of the dependent variable rather
than on the original values. The statistical distribution underlying the Wilcoxon test is standard
normal distribution (hence, producing a Z-value) rather than a t-distribution because the ranks have
a uniform distribution and the standard deviation of the uniform distribution is known because it is
defined by the minimum and maximum values. The advantage of this test is that it is insensitive to
skew in the data and has a standard way of handling tied ranks.
61. See infra Table 2.
62. The logarithms were computed by adding 1 to the value to be transformed prior to taking
the logarithm.
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TABLE 2: TESTS USING THE LOGARITHM
OF DAMAGES FOR THE AUTO CASE
Experimental
e mean
mean std dev
Past Medical Expenses
6.416
2.676
$612
Past Pain and Suffering
6.258
3.064
$522
Future Pain and Suffering 4.200
3.935
$67
Total Compensation
7.701
2.635
$2,210

mean
6.072
5.709
3.852
7.237

Control
mean
std dev e
2.764
$433
3.246
$302
3.849
$47
2.854 $1,390

t
-1.223
-1.681
-0.862
-1.63

p
0.111
0.047
0.195
0.052

Notes: N's are 178 for control and 195 for experimental; t-tests assume equal variances; all p-values are onetailed

We conclude that, for the auto case, there is, at best, a
suggestion that respondents in the experimental condition involving
legal malpractice might have been a bit more generous in their
setting of damages than were respondents in the non-malpractice
control condition.
2. Premises Case
For the premises case, respondents were asked to both make a
determination on liability and, for those who found the homeowner to
have been negligent, to specify a figure for non-economic damages
(such as pain and suffering). A higher percentage of respondents in the
experimental group (42%, n=203) than in the control group (34%,
n=186) found the homeowner to have been negligent. This difference
was statistically significant under the directional (one-tailed) hypothesis,
that there was a higher likelihood of finding negligence in the
malpractice condition than in the non-malpractice condition .05 level
(Z=1.72, p=.042).63
Table 3 shows statistics for the control and experimental groups,
comparing the damages set by respondents who found the homeowner
negligent, along with both t-tests (one for the untransformed
compensation award and one for the natural logarithm of the
compensation award) plus a median test.64 The t-tests support the
hypothesis that lawyer defendants were disadvantaged compared to the
original tortfeasor, but the median test is ambiguous. The results for the
median test at first appear odd, producing a significant test if
observations at the median are classified as above the median and
producing a test statistic approaching zero when those observations are
classified as below the median. The problem here is that the overall
median is $50,000, and there are a substantial number of observations in
63. Limiting the respondents to those who took between 5 and 120 minutes to complete the
survey reduced the gap to 7 percentage points which, combined with slight drop in sample sizes, no
longer produced a statistically significant test of the difference in proportions.
64. See infra Table 3.
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the experimental group falling at $50,000.65 Table 3 also shows the
Wilcoxon rank sum test described previously. Consistent with the t-tests,
the Wilcoxon test was statistically significant. A close look at the data
distribution confirms that there is a broad difference in the damages set
by the experimental and control groups. For example, both the first and
third quartiles are higher for the experimental group ($20,000 to
$100,000) compared to the control group ($10,000 to $75,000). This is
evident in Figure 1, which is a box plot showing the distributions for the
two groups; values have been transformed to base 10 logarithms to
better show the spread.

TABLE 3: DAMAGES FOR PREMISES CASE

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean of log

Control
$46,643
$42,134
$47,372
9.685

e Mean_of_log
n
t-test (untransformed)
t-test (log transform)

$16,082
$40,753
57
82
t=2.08, p=.020
t=2.64, p=.010

median test (below)
median test (above)
Wilcoxon rank sum test

Experimental
$69,413
$50,000
$81,179
10.615

Z=0.21, p=.416
Z=2.02, p=.022
Z=1.93, p=.027

Notes: t-tests assume unequal variances; all p-values
are one-tailed.

65. Two other alternatives—evenly dividing the observations at the median between the
above and below groups or deleting those observations from the test—both produce test statistics
that do not come close to achieving statistical significance.
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE VALUES
FOR PREMISES CASE

From the above analyses, we conclude that there was a tendency in
the premises case for the respondents who found the homeowner to have
been negligent to award somewhat higher damages when defendant was
the plaintiff’s former lawyer than would be the case if the homeowner
were the actual defendant. However, while a difference was detectable,
the magnitude of that difference was modest.
3. Medical Malpractice Case
In the medical malpractice case respondents were asked two
questions which together determine whether the physician was liable or,
in the experimental condition, would have been liable. The first question
asked whether the physician had been negligent: 41% of the control
condition respondents found negligence compared to 34% of the
experimental condition respondents. No statistical test is needed because
the direction of the difference is the reverse of what was hypothesized.
Those respondents who found the physician negligent were then asked
whether the physician’s negligence had caused the plaintiff’s claimed
injury: 77% of the control condition respondents found causation
compared to 87% of the experimental condition respondents. Using a
one-tailed difference of proportions test at the .05 level, that difference
was not statistically significant (Z=1.50, p=.067). Combining these two
questions to determine liability, 31% of the control condition
respondents found the physician liable compared to 30% of the
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experimental condition respondents who would have held the physician
liable. Clearly, there is no evidence in Table 4 to conclude that there was
a greater inclination among those in the experimental group to find the
physician at fault for the plaintiff’s claimed injury.66 It is worth noting
again that the case was designed so that there was negligence on the part
of the physician, but less than 40% of the respondents found negligence,
and even fewer found liability.
TABLE 4: DAMAGES FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean of log
Mean_of_log

e
n
t-test (untransformed)
t-test (log transform)
median test (below)
median test (above)
Wilcoxon rank sum test

Control
Experimental
$454,914
$106,082
$6,000
$12,500
$1,712,454 $262,579
8.098
8.752
$3,287
57

$6,322
60

n/a
t=0.95, p=.171
Z=1.24, p=.108
Z=1.94, p=.026
Z=1.19, p=.118

Notes: t-test for untransformed award omitted because
difference of means is the reverse of the hypothesis; ttest for log transform assumes equal variances; all pvalues are two-tailed.

Table 4 provides statistics and relevant tests of significance for
damages in the medical malpractice case.67 The number of respondents
who provided figures for damages is small because less than a third had
found the doctor liable. The untransformed mean for the control group
was actually higher than that for the experimental group due in part to
one extreme response; however, even removing that response, the mean
of the control ($284,466) exceeded that of the experimental group shown
in Table 4. Using the log transformation, the mean of the experimental
group was higher, as is the median of the experimental group. The tests
of significance produced inconsistent results. Neither the t-test for the
log transform, nor the Wilcoxon test, was statistically significant;68 the
median test produced a statistically significant result if observations
66. See infra Table 4.
67. See supra Table 4.
68. No test need be computed for the untransformed award because the direction of
difference is inconsistent with the hypothesis that awards would on average be higher in the legal
malpractice condition.
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falling exactly at the median are grouped with those above the median
while using the “below” variant is not statistically significant.69
We conclude that there is at best minimal evidence that the
simulated jurors in this case were more plaintiff-friendly when the actual
defendant was the plaintiff’s former lawyer.
IV.

FURTHER ANALYSES

While the experimental setup means that we should expect there to
be no differences between the experimental and control groups other
than the experimental manipulation, it is always possible that some
differences might remain that could impact the results. To test for this
possibility, we constructed regression models that added various controls
in addition to the experimental manipulation. The control variables we
used included the following:
 respondent’s gender;
 respondent’s education (three categories: high school or less,
some college, college degree or more);
 household income (we used a four-point scale:
1=under $25,000, 2=$25,000-$50,000, 3=$50,000-$100,000,
4=over $100,000);
 prior experience on a civil jury;
 experience as a defendant in a lawsuit (other than divorce);
 experience as a plaintiff in a lawsuit (other than divorce);
 political ideology (three categories collapsed from a sevenpoint scale: conservative, middle-of-the-road, liberal);
 whether any member of the respondent’s immediate family
was a lawyer or was currently in law school; and
 for the medical malpractice case only, whether any member
of the respondent’s immediate family was a physician or was
currently in medical school.
We estimated logistic regression models for the liability issue and
ordinary linear regression models for damage amounts (both
untransformed and log transformed). Most of the regressions produced
minimal effects from the control variables, and none revealed effects of
the experimental manipulation that would lead us to modify our
conclusions about one or more of the three versions of the cases used in
the study.

69. Both of the two variants, dropping those cases at the median or splitting those cases
evenly between above and below, produce tests that almost meet the .05 one-tailed threshold
(p=.052 for “drop” and .056 for “split”).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this study, we set out to test the argument that juries are more
plaintiff-friendly in cases tried in the context of admitted legal
malpractice than they would be if they were simply trying the casewithin-the-case. We designed three different cases to use in our test of
this hypothesis, each involving a different context (auto accident,
premises liability, and medical malpractice) and differing in the evidence
and circumstances the jurors had to assess.70 In only one of the three
cases, the premises case, did we find clear support for our
hypothesis. Moreover, even in that case, both the differences in the
probability of finding for the plaintiff and the difference between the
amounts awarded in the experimental and control conditions would be
best described as modest.
There were hints of possible effects for the auto case, where
respondents were only asked to set damage amounts. The fact that the
possible effect we did find was limited to economic damages (that is,
past medical expenses) suggests that jurors might be inclined to accept a
plaintiff’s position when there is a question about causation, at least with
regard to expenses the plaintiff might have incurred, but not with regard
to compensation for pain and suffering. Interestingly, this interpretation
is consistent with the actual result in the case upon which our narrative
was based. In that case, the jury did award the costs of surgery for the
claimed knee injury while not awarding damages the plaintiff requested
for the pain and suffering associated with the knee injury.
There was no consistent evidence of any of the hypothesized effects
in the medical malpractice case. Even though the case narrative was
designed such that there was negligence and liability on the part of the
physician, less than one third of our respondents in either condition
found that the doctor was, or would have been, liable. This amount is
even lower than the 46% Robertson and Yokum reported for their
control condition when they used a video version of the case.71 While
some critics might argue that the nature of the case was sufficiently
technical that lay jurors even in an actual trial, to say nothing of subjects
acting as jurors in a simulation experiment, would have significant
70. See supra Part III.A.
71. Robertson & Yokum, supra note 48, at 777. There is one unexplored explanation for the
surprisingly low likelihood that respondents found the doctor-defendant liable (both in our study
and in Robertson and Yokum’s experiment). Specifically, the scenario was created such that the
defendant-physician had failed to follow published guidelines for dealing with patients who
presented as the plaintiff did; however, the respondents were not specifically informed of those
guidelines. If the testimony had made clear that the guidelines had not been followed, more subjects
would likely have found the physician to be negligent and liable.
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difficulty grasping the relevant details and responded by giving the
physician the benefit of the doubt. However, that does not explain the
absence of differences in the amount of damages awarded when the
physician was determined to be liable.
The results in the present experiment are, at best, suggestive of how
things work in practice. As with any jury simulation study, there are
inevitable questions about external validity, and those issues are
probably enhanced in our study. While we sought to design our
experimental scenarios to emphasize the lawyer as defendant, the
manipulation check variable indicates that we had mixed success. This,
in turn, suggests that telling respondents that the lawyer is the defendant,
as we have done, is a far cry from jurors seeing the lawyer sitting at the
defense table over the several days (or more) that an actual trial would
take. However, for an empirical exploration of the question we have
posed, the only real option would be some form of jury simulation. We
could have made our study more realistic by creating video versions of
the trial, having groups of respondents watch one of the two versions of
the video and then have the groups deliberate for a period of time before
taking votes. The cost of such a study would be substantial, particularly
if it were to include more than one case. Furthermore, one might expect
that, if there was a very substantial anti-lawyer effect, even a relatively
weak experimental setup would produce some clear effects; on the other
hand, if there were at most modest anti-lawyer effects, the type of
experiment used here could be very problematic.
Returning to the question we opened with: does our study provide
evidence of popular hostility toward lawyers generally, and plaintiffs’
lawyers in particular? Maybe a little, but we would be hard pressed to
argue that our study suggests that lay jurors want to punish lawyers by
favoring plaintiffs in legal malpractice trials. Perhaps the “jurors” in our
study saw themselves in the role of potential defendants to the
underlying case. Perhaps our results reflect the reality of the perception
among plaintiffs’ lawyers that jurors have become less favorable toward
plaintiffs as a result of the campaign by insurance companies and
conservative interest groups.72
Finally, what are the potential implications of our results for
practicing lawyers who might face a legal malpractice claim and for the
insurers and defense counsel who handle those claims? If one is
prepared to accept the validity of the present experiment we have

72. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Texas Plaintiffs’ Practice in the Age of Tort
Reform: Survival of the Fittest—It’s Even More True Now, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 295-97
(2006).
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conducted—that is, our findings reflect what would happen in actual
legal malpractice trials—then the fear lawyers express about juror
prejudice disadvantaging lawyer-defendants in such trials is misplaced.
Lawyers certainly do not have the advantages that physicians seem to
have in medical malpractice trials,73 but our simulated jurors did not
express the approbation of lawyers to affect how they judged cases or set
damages. This point was reinforced by a lawyer who specialized in
plaintiffs’ legal malpractice whom we interviewed as part of the larger
study. When we raised this issue and briefly told him about the results of
our experiment, he said he was “not surprised,” and went on to observe:
“It is a perception, but I do not think it’s accurate.” He went on to
explain why he did not think it was an issue:
Good defense lawyers handle [the issue of anti-lawyer sentiment] in voir
dire very effectively:
Defense lawyer: “How many people don’t like lawyers?”
Everybody raises their hand.
Defense lawyer: And tell me when you needed a will, who did you
go to?”
Juror: “I went to a lawyer.”
Defense lawyer: “When you got divorced, who did you go to?”
Juror: “I went to a lawyer.”
Defense lawyer: “And did you depend on those lawyers?”
Juror: “Yes.”
Defense lawyer: “How did they do?”
Juror: “Well they did a pretty good job.”
Defense lawyer: “Those lawyers weren’t so bad, were they?”

73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

